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Abstract 
Macroeconomic forecasts are used extensively in industry and government despite the lack of 
accuracy and reliability. Prediction markets as a community forecasting method have begun to gain 
interest in academia industry alike. An open question is how to design incentive schemes and feedback 
mechanisms to motivate online communities to contribute and thereby increase the predictive power of 
the market. We design a prediction market for macroeconomic variables that aggregates information 
from a cross-section of participants. We analyze participation and feedback in this online community. 
We show that a weekly newsletter that acts as a reminder drives participation. In public goods projects 
participation feedback has been found to increase participants' contributions. We find that the 
competition inherent in markets appears to dominate classical feedback mechanisms. We show that 
forecast errors fall over the prediction horizon. The market-generated forecasts compare well with the 
Bloomberg- survey forecasts, the industry standard. Additionally we can predict community forecast 
error using an implicit market measure. 
 
Keywords:  Feedback, Incentives, Macro-economic Forecasting, Prediction Markets,  
 
Introduction 
Important policy decisions are made based on the forecasts for economic variables (GDP, unemployment, 
exports). It is a well-established fact that traditional economic forecast models lack accuracy (Osterloh 
2008; McNees 1992; Schuh 2001). The current approaches mix expert knowledge with historic 
extrapolation and models of the economy. They are often found to be inadequately able to capture rapid 
economic changes. The last financial crisis demonstrated the drawbacks of economic forecasting. Weeks 
after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, the consensus opinion was for a 2 % increase in 
German GDP for 2009. In 2009 German GDP dropped by 4.5%. Another issue is the reliance of the 
current forecasts on expert input. Experts are prone to biases and political influence and generally do not 
perform better than novices in forecasting future events (Armstrong 2008). Due to the reliance on 
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personal judgments, forecasts have been found to exhibit a bias towards optimism when the trend 
changes (Batchelor, 2007). In Germany forecasts are produced by numerous institutions and released on 
a periodical basis. Thus a pure forecast consumer (e.g. decision maker) might find it difficult to aggregate 
the various forecasts and come to a confident appraisal. Internet communities offer the advantage of 
instant information exchange and group decision making that is difficult in other settings. But, how can 
online communities be designed to facilitate information aggregation on macro-economic variables?  
Further, how can incentives schemes be designed to motivate participants to contribute and share their 
information?  
Over the last couple of years prediction markets as a forecasting method have gained interest in academia 
and industry. They facilitate and support decision making through aggregating expectations about events 
(Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). The roots of their predictive power are twofold; the market provides the 
incentives for traders to truthfully disclose their information and an algorithm to weight opinions (Arrow 
et al., 2008). We thus setup a prediction market for economic variables called Economic Indicator 
Exchange (EIX). The EIX play money prediction market is specifically designed to continuously forecast 
economic indicators such as GDP, inflation, IFO index, investments, exports, and unemployment figures 
in Germany. In order to build a sustainable community with continuous participation we design and test 
an incentive scheme for long-lasting play-money prediction markets. We also evaluate the effect of 
feedback mechanisms on activity level in a market-based system. Finally, by comparing market forecasts 
to ’Bloomberg’ survey forecasts we show the potential of markets as information aggregation tools. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The second section gives a brief review of previous 
markets for economic variables. Furthermore incentives schemes and feedback for information exchanges 
are discussed. The third section presents the IS-artifact and details the field experiment setting. Section 
four summarizes the research questions. The subsequent section evaluates the IS-artifact from a 
forecasting perspective. In Section six we conclude.  
Related Work 
Prediction markets as online communities 
A common approach to economic forecasting is to identify experts to make predictions. These experts use 
statistical models combined with heuristics, which are based on an expert’s experience and intuition. 
However experts are prone to biases and political influence and generally do not perform better than 
novices in forecasting future events (Armstrong 2008). Furthermore macro-economic forecasts suffer 
from imitation behavior (Osterloh, 2008). Group decision making is a technique often applied to deal 
with these limitations. Internet communities offer the advantage of instant information exchange and 
group decision that is not possible in a real-life. An arising question is how to build and maintain internet 
communities to forecast macro-economic variables. Furthermore how can informed people be motivated 
and incentivized to participate in information sharing and collaboration?  A certain type of online 
communities, so called prediction markets have emerged as a forecasting tool for wide range of 
applications.  
Prediction markets facilitate and support decision making through aggregating expectations about events 
(Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). In most cases they allow anonymous participation, which may increase the 
likelihood of nonconformist to participate and reveal information. The roots of their predictive power are 
twofold; the market provides the incentives for traders to truthfully disclose their information and an 
algorithm to weight opinions (Arrow et al., 2008). Previous work showed that same principles apply in 
play-money prediction markets in which prizes are shuffled among top performing traders (Rosenbloom 
and Notz, 2006). 
The most basic trading mechanism for prediction markets is based on a continuous double auction for one 
stock which represents the outcome of an event. The stock will pay 1 if an event has the predicted outcome 
and else the stock will be worthless. Market participants form expectations about the outcome of an event. 
Comparable to financial markets, they buy if they find that prices underestimate the event in question and 
they sell a stock if they find that prices overestimate the probability of an event. Thus communication in 
such a system is limited to the market language; bids and offers. 
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Markets for Economic Derivatives 
Financial markets for macro-economic variables have been used since the 80s. The Coffee, Sugar and 
Cocoa Exchange established a futures market on the consumer price index allowing traders to hedge on 
inflation. The market, however, was closed due to low interest (Mbemap 2004). In 1993 Robert Shiller 
argued for the creation ’Macro Markets’ which would allow a more effective risk allocation (Shiller 1993). 
In an attempt to set up a market to predict economic variables in 2002 Goldman Sachs and Deutsche 
Bank created the so called ’Economic Derivatives’ market. It tries to predict macro-economic outcomes 
such as ISM Manufacturing, change in Non-Farm Payrolls, Initial Jobless Claims and consumer price 
index (Gadanecz et al., 2007). The traded contracts are securities with payoffs based on macroeconomic 
data releases. The instruments are traded as a series (between 10-20) of binary options. For example a 
single data release of the retail sales in April 2005 was traded as 18 stocks. In order to maximize liquidity 
the market operators use a series of occasional Dutch auctions just before the data releases instead of the 
more common continuous trading on most financial markets. Thus the market provides hedging 
opportunities against event risks and a short horizon market forecast of certain economic variables. By 
analyzing the forecast efficiency Gurkaynak and Wolfers (2006) find that market generated forecasts are 
very similar but more accurate than survey based forecasts1.  
In an attempt to forecast inflation changes in Germany, Berlemann and Nelson (2005) set up a series of 
markets. The markets feature continuous trading of binary contracts. In a similar field experiment 
Berlemann et al. (2005) use a similar system in order to aggregate information about inflation 
expectations in Bulgaria. All in all, the reported forecasts results in both experiments are mixed but 
promising.  
Feedback & Incentive schemes in online markets 
Prediction markets work by incentivizing information revelation and participation. Hence traders can be 
rewarded based on their performance which is directly linked to the quality of their contributions. There 
are two common ways to set incentives in prediction markets. In real money markets traders invest 
money and gain directly like in financial markets. Due to the legal restrictions on gambling, setting up a 
real-money market incurs huge technical and regulatory costs. As an alternative, market operators can set 
up play money prediction markets. Instead of real money, participants are endowed with a virtual 
currency. Previous research has shown that play-money markets perform as well as real-money markets 
predicting future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Rosenbloom and Notz, 2006). In order to 
encourage participation and information revelation market operators shuffle prizes, according to 
incentives schemes. Luckner and Weinhardt (2007) study the impact of three different incentive schemes 
on prediction accuracy in short-term laboratory experiments. They find that a rank-order scheme 
outperforms a fixed payment incentive scheme and surprisingly a performance-compatible payment. It 
remains unclear how participants can be incentivized in long term field prediction markets.  
A common way to increase participants’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to public goods projects is to 
give user feedback and recognition. Cheshire and Antin (2008), as well as a study conducted by Ling et al. 
(2005), try to raise user contribution in online communities through feedback mechanisms. Many 
motivational theories in psychology include a feedback component such as the goal setting theory from 
Locke (2001). According to Cheshire and Antin (2008), there are three different feedback mechanisms 
which are assumed to lead to an increased contribution rate.  
• Gratitude is a simple ’Thank you’-message displayed after a contribution. Beenen et al., (2004) 
find that sending a one-time ’thank-you’ email can raise contributions.  
• A Historical Reminder is a feedback mechanism, which informs the participant about the number 
of individual contributions. According Cheshire and Antin (2008), this may help the user to think about 
his own past contribution behavior.  
                                                             
1 One must note that the Bloomberg survey forecasts are published on Fridays before the data release, 
whereas the auction was run -and the forecast was generated- on the data release day. 
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• Relative Ranking displays the contribution frequency compared to peers. The knowledge about 
cumulative group behavior can be beneficial to the production of a public good, like contributions to a 
Wiki (Cheshire 2007). 
Additionally one might consider using social ranking feedback, which illustrates a ranking within a group 
of users who created a similar number of contributions. One might argue that information about 
individuals with a similar ranking, and therefore the same amount of contributions, leads to an increase 
in social competition, and therefore, positively impacts the motivation to contribute. However -to our 
knowledge- social rankings have not been tested yet. As most work on the effect of feedback mechanisms 
on user participation and contribution relates to cooperative environments such as public Wikis, it 
remains unclear if and how the effects can be reproduced in more competitive environments such as 
electronic markets. 
An economic indicator exchange 
In October 2009 a play money prediction market was launched specifically designed to forecast economic 
indicators such as GDP, inflation, investments, export and unemployment figures in Germany. The goal is 
to forecast the indicators over longer time periods in advance and continuously aggregate economic 
information. The market called Economic Indicator Exchange (EIX)2 was launched in cooperation with 
the leading German economic newspaper ’Handelsblatt’. The cooperation aims at reaching a wide and 
well informed audience interested in financial markets and economic development. We thus expect no 
problems understanding the indicators and the concept of trading. The market is publicly available over 
the Internet and readers where invited to join. The registration is free and requires besides a valid email 
address just minimal personal information. 
Market & contract design 
The market design features a continuous double auction without designated market maker. Participants 
are allowed to submit marketable limit orders with 0.01 increments through the web-based interface. 
After registration participants are endowed with 1,000 stocks of each contract and 100,000 play money 
units. We propose to represent continuous outcomes with one stock and define a linear payout function. 
Contracts for each economic indicator are paid out according to equation 1.  
 (1) 
A contract is worth: 100 +/-  times the percentage change for an indicator in play money (e.g. a change 
of 2.1 % results in a price of 121). We set  to 10. Therefore the representable outcome ranges from -10% 
to infinity. To represent the whole outcome range from -100% to infinity  could be set to one. Previous 
work indicates that market participants find it difficult to estimate minor changes in the underlying 
(Stathel et al. 2009). Hence we propose to scale the minor changes to a certain level. Looking at historical 
data there were no events where German GDP dropped 10% per quarter. The rationale for setting  to 10 
was the deliberation that participants find it more intuitive to enter integers in order to express 
reasonable accuracy. Additionally German statistical data releases rarely come with more than one 
decimal.  
Table 1 summarizes the economic variables tradable on the market. Due to the payout function and the 
selection of the corresponding units; all stock prices are expected to roughly range between 50 and 150. 
Therefore participants could similarly gain by investing in specific indicators. The indicators are a mix of 
leading -forecasting the economy- (e.g. Investments) and lagging -describing the state of the economy-
(e.g. Unemployment numbers) economic indicators. To facilitate longer forecast horizons every indicator 
is represented by three independent stocks each representing the next three data releases ( , , ). As a 
consequence the initial forecast periods vary between one month for monthly released indicators and up 
to 3 quarters for quarterly released variables. One day before the release date the trading in the concerned 
                                                             
2 www.eix-market.de 
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stock is stopped. Finally the stocks are liquidated according to the payout function defined in equation 1. 
As soon as the trading in one stock stops, a new stock of the same indicator (e.g.  ) is introduced into the 
market. This means that participants received 1000 new stocks of the respective indicator. All in all 
participants are able to continuously trade 18 stocks at all times. 
A ranking of all the traders sorted by their deposit value, i.e. the balance of their cash account plus the 
value of the contracts they held at the specific point in time, is not part of the trading screen but is 
separately displayed on the EIX web portal. Available account information for individual traders includes 
the number of shares held in each contract, the balance of the cash account, the total value of their 
deposit, a list of outstanding buy and sell orders, as well as a list of trades. The portal also provides more 
information on the prizes traders can win; the operational principle of the prediction market including a 
video tutorial and frequently asked questions, as well as up-to-date news stream related to the German 
economic development.  
Table 1: Economic variables 
Indicator Unit Data Release 
Cycle 
Payout 
Number 
Payout Function 
Exports %-Changes monthly 12  
GDP %-Changes quarterly 4  
IFO Index ABS-Changest-1 monthly 3  
Inflation %-Changest-12 monthly 11  
Investments %-Changest-1 quarterly 5  
Unemployment Million (ABS) monthly 12  
Trading Interface 
The trading interface is displayed in figure 1. Participants have convenient access to the order book with 
10 accumulated levels of visible depth (I1), the price development (I2), the account information (I3) and 
market information (I4) such as the last trading day. As additional information the Handelsblatt provides 
access to an up-to-date economic news-stream (I5) and finally the indicator’s last year’s performance (I6) 
is displayed. Participants are able to customize their trading interface individually. By clicking the small 
arrows the six information panels open and close. In the default setting, only the trading mask and the six 
headlines are visible. After each submitted order the chosen interface is saved per user. On user return the 
system opens the previously used interface elements on default. Moreover, a short description of the 
market comprising the respective payoff function is shown as part of the trading screen. 
 
  
Online Communities and Digital Collaborations 
6 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
 
Figure 1.  Trading screen with open information panels and feedback 
mechanism 
 
Incentives 
As mentioned, the market is a free to join play money market. In order to motivate participants 
intrinsically we provided two interface features; traders could follow their performance on a leader board 
and they could form groups with others to spur competition with friends. To increase participants’ 
motivation and to provide incentives to contribute information we hand out prizes worth 36,000 Euro. In 
order to be useful, an accurate prediction must be determined well in advance of the actual outcome. It 
makes little sense to run a market where one obtains the prediction just before the actual outcome occurs. 
This sounds obvious, but it is actually quite difficult to achieve, because traders want to know how their 
’investment’ turned out, fairly quickly. As we try to forecast longer periods the incentive scheme has to 
address this problem. So the incentives are divided in two parts (a) monthly prizes and (b) yearly prizes. 
The 8 yearly prizes (total value 10,000 Euro) are handed out according to the portfolio ranking at the end 
of the market. The monthly prizes are shuffled among participants who fulfill two requirements for the 
respected month: (i) they increase their portfolio value and (ii) they actively participate by submitting at 
least five orders. Both incentives are clearly communicated through the interface. For the yearly prizes the 
leader board indicates the current status of all participants. The monthly winning status is displayed 
individually just after each login.  
Feedback 
In our market setting we distinguish between three types of feedback:  
• Interface feedback  
• Market-based feedback  
• Participation feedback  
The first feedback type is directly communicated through the trading interface. If participants enter a 
limit price another field displays the related prediction for that price. Vice versa, participants can change 
their prediction and see that the related price adapts automatically (See figure 1, F). This feature helps to 
communicate the complex contract design previously described.  
Market based feedback is communicated on various levels. First of all, contract prices reflect the current 
aggregated belief of other market participants. Moreover, the orderbook displays (e.g. with a high spread) 
the current market confidence about a certain event. Finally, after contracts are liquidated, participants 
can easily follow their own contribution in relation to their peers. This confronts forecasters with their 
own forecasting performance. Additionally, as good forecasters increase their portfolio value they gain 
more weight over market run-time. 
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Figure 2: Participation feedback 
 
Participation feedback is communicated directly after a user submits an order. Figure 2 depicts the 
different participation feedback types. The No Feedback type confirms the user interaction and only 
summarizes the offer properties. The Gratitude adds a Thank you for your prediction message. The third 
feedback just prints the number of contributions. The relative ranking feedback displays the contribution 
frequency compared to peers. Finally the last feedback type (social ranking) displays a short part of the 
overall ranking list. We created six treatment groups. We used the four feedback mechanisms described in 
the last section. Additionally we added a control treatment group with no feedback and a randomized 
treatment group, which sees randomly one of the four feedback types after each submitted bid. 
Software architecture 
In addition to the key design elements of the EIX prediction market described, one also has to design the 
web-based trading software as well as the facilities handling information about the traders’ accounts, the 
order matching and quote updates from a technical point of view.  
 
Figure 3: Software system 
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The EIX prediction market software is an advancement of two previously run (Stathel et al. 2009). The 
system is implemented in Grails. It features a modularized architecture in order to keep it easy to 
maintain and expendable by services and functionality. Due to the previously unknown number of users 
the software platform has to be scalable. Figure 2 summarizes the whole system from three perspectives; 
IT-infrastructure, application logic and the core order management. The IT-infrastructure is provided by 
the Forschungszentrum Informatik, Karlsruhe (FZI), it consists of three physical servers; a Squid reverse 
proxy -caching the static pages, a designated PostgreSQL server for the database and a tomcat application 
server -running the application logic. The application logic has been set up following the model-view-
controller concept. Therefore it is separated in three layers; one handling the external communication e.g. 
the website presentation, one for the internal database querying and finally one running the core order 
processing. As the core element the order management processes all incoming orders. The EIX market 
employs the commonly used trading mechanism; the continuous double auction (CDA). In a CDA known 
e.g. from the Deutsche Börse system Xetra, traders submit buy and sell orders which are executed 
immediately if they are executable against orders on the other side of the order book (Madhavan 1992). If 
orders are not immediately executable, orders are queued in an order book and remain there until they 
are matched with a counter-offer, or are actively deleted by either the market operator or the submitting 
participant. Orders are executed according to price/time priority, i.e. buy orders with a higher limit and 
vice versa sell orders with a lower limit take priority. In case several orders were placed with the same 
limit price, the orders which were submitted earlier are executed first. One of the main advantages of 
using a CDA is the fact that markets with a CDA pose no financial risk for market operators as they are a 
zero-sum game. Moreover, the CDA allows for continuous information incorporation into prices and 
consequently traders are capable of quickly reacting to events. 
Research Questions  
The main research question is how to design an online community to facilitate information aggregation of 
macro-economic variables. This subsequently leads to question of how participants can be motivated to 
contribute and share their information for longer time horizons. We try this by first implementing a 
specifically designed market environment. Secondly we design a play-money incentive schemes which 
rewards participants according to their performance. How well does this incentive scheme fulfill the goal 
of keeping participants active and contributing? It is especially interesting how good this incentive system 
works for longer time horizons. 
In order to further motivate participants intrinsically we use feedback mechanisms.  The first question is 
which of the feedback types works best at motivating contributions. Secondly if we find any differences in 
the activity level, do the additional contributions improve the community forecast? This leads to the 
question of forecast accuracy in general. How does a community of novices perform in comparison to an 
expert panel? Additionally if we analyze user interactions can we deduce user forecast confidence? 
Results 
The following section first presents some descriptive market statistics and then evaluates the market 
generated forecasts. We show that the level of participation is mainly driven by a weekly newsletter which 
acts as a reminder. Furthermore we find that the induced competitiveness of market environments seem 
to superpose classical feedback mechanisms. Turning to the community generated forecasts we find that 
forecast accuracy improves constantly over time and that generated forecasts performed well in 
comparison to the Bloomberg-survey forecasts. Additionally we can show that the market has a 
supplementary benefit by implicitly providing a measure for forecast confidence. 
Participation, Feedback & Incentives 
The following data includes the time span from 30th October 2009 till 31st of October 2010. In total 1006 
participants registered at the EIX market, of those 680 submitted at least one order. Altogether 
participants submitted 45,808 orders resulting in 22,574 executed transactions. Figure 5 shows the 
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market activity over time. In the respected time frame 47 stocks were paid out. In order to keep 
participants active and informed we sent out a weekly newsletter summarizing the up-to-date economic 
news. The sending days varied during the week. Analyzing the impact of the newsletter, we find an 
increased activity measured as orders per day (on average +60 orders on sending days; t-value: 3.23, 
). The peak activity on sending days is followed in almost linear decreasing activity in 
subsequent five days. 
As described in the previous section, we implemented five feedback treatments. We used the following 
OLS regression:  to test the influence of each feedback 
treatment on each individual activity level. In the baseline treatment no special feedback is given. As the 
number of orders is power-law distributed, following (Raban 2008) we use a logarithmic transformation 
of the orders variable. The results are depicted in Table 2. The model is dominated by the newsletter 
effect. Participants receiving the newsletter submit significantly more orders. As all feedback treatments 
show no significant effect, we conclude that feedback mechanisms do not induce any additional 
motivation to contribute in competitive market environments. It seems that different individual 
competitiveness levels superpose any feedback effect. 
Table 2: Trading activity and feedback mechanism 
(N=410) 
log(Orders) 
Newsletter Thanks Social 
ranking 
Relative 
ranking 
Number of 
trades 
Random 
Estimate 0.26 -0.001 -0.32 -0.22 -0.14 0.09 
(t-value) 3.23 -0.03 -1.22 -0.9 -0.56 0.36 
 
As described previously we designed an incentive scheme that aims at keeping participants’ motivation 
high over the market run-time. Figure 4 presents the number of active participants on a monthly basis. 
We find a clear novelty effect, which is evident in the high activity levels in the first two months. While the 
number of active participants decreases we find that the percentage of participants fulfilling the monthly 
incentive requirements stays at the same level. The slight drop in the last month is due to the fact that we 
started the second market round in parallel. We conclude that the incentive structure worked well for 
such a long running experiment.  
 
Figure 4: Participants staying active 
Community forecasts 
In binary markets the prediction market prices typically provide useful (albeit sometimes biased) 
estimates of average beliefs about the probability an event (Manski 2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006). In 
our linear outcome market prices do not reflect the probability of an outcome but the market participant’s 
aggregated belief about the fundamental value of the underlying indicator. Thus the interpretation of the 
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price is directly linked to the outcome value. In our case there are various ways to generate an economic 
forecast from market prices. For example participants can either infer that the  or the last trading 
price are the forecast for stock  at time  . In the following sections a market  refers to the 
average transaction price on day  . A first indication about the market outcome is given by the deviation 
between market prices and fundamental values. In the following the difference between the fundamental 
value of the stock i ( ) and the market  represents the  . One would expect market 
prices to converge to the final outcome and thus a reduction of forecast error over time. 
 
Figure 5: Number of orders and absolute forecast error over time 
Forecast error reduction over time 
An important question is whether the market continuously aggregates information. In Figure 5 the 
average absolute error over time is depicted. One can see a steady decreasing absolute error in the last 70 
days. We run an OLS-regression analysis to quantify the error reduction per day. In order to control for 
indicator effects we add the indicator dummies .  
 (2) 
In the last 70 days the average error is reduced by 0.011 per day (t-value 6.27, ). We 
conclude that forecast uncertainty was reduced over time, information aggregation took place and hence 
the absolute error was reduced. In table 3 (last column) the error reduction per day is presented for each 
indicator separately. 
Error per indicator 
On an aggregated level we compare the market-generated forecasts ten days before the data release 
( ) to the fundamental value. Table 3 summarizes the findings. We find that the market 
overestimates the fundamental values slightly (2.069 vs. 1.734; t-value 0.69, n.s.). When comparing 
standard deviations we find that the forecasts are significantly less volatile than the fundamental values 
(1.41 vs. 2.92; f-value 4.29, ) over the period. We see that market forecasts are more stable than 
outcomes. This is in line with forecasts from other methods (Vajna 1977). A reason for this is that 
forecasters regularly tend to publish moderate, conservative estimates rather than extreme values.  
To evaluate the forecast performance we compare the market forecasts to Bloomberg survey forecasts. For 
Bloomberg forecasts the time between the forecast and the data release varies as the forecast is made 
public on Fridays before the release. The direct comparison of these two show that they perform at least 
equally well. One must note that the Bloomberg survey forecasts are published on Fridays before the data 
release, whereas we use the market generated forecasts 10 days before the data release. Hence market 
prices could not have been influenced by the Bloomberg estimate. 
 Teschner et. al. / Participation, Feedback & Incentives in a Competitive Forecasting Community 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 11 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparing market and Bloomberg forecasts 
  Market Error Bloomberg 
Error 
Comparison 
 N Median Mean Median Mean EIX vs. Bloomberg 
Exports 12 2.31 3.44 1.95 2.88 7 vs. 5 
GDP 4 0.73 0.64 0.2 0.34 2 vs. 2 
IFO Index 3 0.55 0.52 - - - 
Inflation 11 0.24 0.26 0.2 0.35 5 vs. 4 (5 draws) 
Investments 5 1.14 1.27 - - - 
Unemployment 12 0.06 0.06 - - - 
Predicting community forecast error 
Another important question for interpreting point forecasts is the uncertainty attached to the forecast. 
Neither Bloomberg nor market forecasts provide explicit uncertainty information. However one might 
interpret implicit market properties as proxies for the underlying uncertainty. One possible implicit 
market measure for market confidence is liquidity. A measure for the liquidity is an asset’s ability to be 
sold rapidly, with minimal loss of value, any time within market hours (Harris 2002). Quoted spreads are 
the simplest and most common measure of trading costs and can easily be calculated using trade and 
orderbook data. Let  be the ask price for a stock i at time t and  the respective bid price.  
denotes the mid quote then the quoted spread is calculated as follows:  
  
Another proxy for market uncertainty could be a high price variability which indicates the traders’ 
disagreement about the fundamental price of an asset. Finally, the higher the number of traders active in 
one stock, the higher the chance that all available information has been incorporated. We run an OLS 
regression to analyze if the three factors predict the forecast error magnitude. Table 4 presents the results. 
An increase in the quoted spreads by one point increases the forecast error by 3 points on average (p-
value < 1%). This seems reasonable as the market participants acknowledge the underlying high 
uncertainty and set the spreads accordingly. Both other implicit market measures have to explanatory 
value. 
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Table 4: Predicting community forecast errors 
Variable Estimate t-statistic 
 3.37 2.68 
 -0.00 -0.10 
 -0.01 -0.18 
Conclusion 
Internet communities offer the advantage of instant information exchange and group decision that is not 
possible in a real-life. We designed an online community facilitating information aggregation of macro-
economic variables. Furthermore we presented an incentives scheme well suited to motivate participants 
contributing their information for longer time horizons. Investigating the level of participation, we find 
that a weekly newsletter, which acts as a reminder, drives activity. Assuming that classical feedback 
mechanisms would lead to different participation levels, we find that the induced competitiveness of 
market environments seem to superpose classical feedback mechanisms. Turning to the community 
generated forecasts we find that forecast accuracy improves constantly over time and that generated 
forecasts performed well in comparison to the Bloomberg-survey forecasts. Additionally we can show that 
the market has a supplementary benefit by implicitly providing a measure for forecast confidence. We 
hope our approach will positively impact the market design community and forecast results will 
eventually influence economic policy making in Germany by providing continuous information about the 
state of the economy. 
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